

The influence of Algeria's (Non)Colonial Period on Its Problematic Present

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Abstract

A review of the French rule in Algeria can provide answers about its legacy. Unlike other territories in the Middle East and North Africa, Algeria was not a colony in the strict sense of the term because during the period of French domination (between 1830 and 1962), it was considered an integral part of France. However, the *égalité* boasted in Europe was never real in Africa and during those years Algerian society was segregated. The effects of this period on independent Algeria make it similar to other countries in the region and are the precedent of its recurring crises, including the Civil War in the 1990s and the *Hirak* protests in 2019 that demonstrated social unconformity with the lack of democracy, economic crisis and corruption within the government. Current challenges for Algeria account for issues such as political legitimacy, urge of economic diversification, food supply, unemployment policies, and security concerns.

Keywords: Algeria, French Rule, Colonialism, Arab-Amazigh conflict, Political Crisis

Introduction

"Ce qu'ils n'aiment pas en moi, c'est l'algérien"
Albert Camus, *Le Premier Homme*

The First Man was the autobiographical novel that Camus was writing when he died. Indeed, the manuscript was in a suitcase found near the car in which he had the tragic traffic accident in January 1960. On the 50th anniversary of his death, there was an intense debate in Algeria regarding Camus' literary legacy and his meaning for the North-African country. Whereas some considered him an example of a colonial stain on Algeria's history, others highlighted the presence of his birthplace within his work. His double condition as French-Algerian, which provokes an identity tension, sometimes noticeable in his writings, is a representation of what Algeria was under the French rule for more than 130 years, whose effects have been present during the whole independent period and can be observed even today.

Despite centuries of Arabization and Islamization in which Algeria was part of several caliphates, including the Ottoman one that ruled for more than three hundred years, it is possible to state that the modern history of Algeria begins in 1830, when the French invaded Algiers and after some resistance expelled the Ottoman power which previously had been established there since the 16th century. However, the preceding phenomena that in some cases can be recalled for more than 2,000 years helps to understand the social component during the French dominance and which remains. For instance, the Berber population that has dwelled in the region for millennia and whose members know themselves as *Amazigh*, shapes one of the ethnic tensions remaining in contemporary Algeria. A similar statement could be done in relation to the Islamization process in North Africa. Even so, it is the time beginning with colonial rule that will be taken into account for the purposes of this article, because it aims at constructing a brief abstract of Algerian history since the French installation, emphasizing the independence war, the civil war in the 1990s and the recent 2019 crisis around President Boutelifka's renunciation, considering all these events as a whole and also as a continuum. In this sense the document tries to determine the general effects of the colonial period on posterior incidents.

Another goal can also be to lay out a discussion about the meaning of "colonial" itself taking into consideration that Algeria was a special case not only in the history of French colonization but also the world. Unlike the different types of political control that both the British and the French deployed in the Middle East in the 19th and 20th centuries, such as protectorates, mandates or colonies, in strict sense, Algeria was not, at least formally, one of them. It was considered, and legally established since 1881, as an integral part of French territory, an overseas department, and because of this, issues concerning Algeria were assumed by the Ministry of Interior

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Affairs and not by the Foreign Ministry. The reasons for this distinction and its consequences on French period social life and the post-French era are also interesting features to find out. Maybe it will bring clarity regarding if Algeria faces similar problems as other former colonies in the region or if, on the contrary, it has distinct challenges.

Background

The economic expansion experienced during the Industrial Revolution and the necessity of capturing markets in the Middle East and Africa, stimulated the struggle among European powers to gain influence on Islamic and Arab world, which was mostly dominated by the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 19th century. In the case of France, after the restoration of the monarchy, the contiguous North African coast became a priority to avoid the stagnation of its expanding economy. Using as an excuse a claim regarding French debts on wheat imports from Algeria, in May 1830 a dispute between the French consul and a representative of the Ottomans triggered the decision of invading Algiers. The conquest of this city was relatively quick but around the country the local resistance was strong. One of the indigenous leaders, named Abd Al-Khadar, who declared himself the 'Commander of the Faithful' and called for jihad against the invaders, even achieved to be recognized as the governor of two thirds of Algeria in a treaty (Tafna) signed with France in 1837. However, some years later, the war against him was finally won, he was expelled from Algeria, and the French officially established their dominance. According to Evans and Philips, who try to explain the influence of the colonial period and the independence process in the subsequent violent episodes and in general political instability of recent Algerian history, the Tafna treaty, in theory, previewed a peaceful convivence between the Arab government and French territories. Unfortunately, as they note, "the frontiers were ill-defined and this made the return to open warfare only a matter of time" (Evans and Philips, 2007: 29). This quote provides a solid basis to analyze the beginning of the French rule in Algeria as well as the Middle East post-colonial era in general.

From 1830 to 1871 Algeria was under French military control. In fact, general Bugeaud, who was the commander of the initial conquest fleet and who in the French narrative is considered to be the founding father of modern Algeria, was designated as governor. During those decades the hostilities were permanent and the use of force, in some cases disproportional, was helpful to consolidate the colonists' settlements in the country. Meanwhile, the desire for Algeria becoming not a simple colonial territory and therefore providing it special treatment (in part to deal with the constant rebellions by local armed groups) was explicit since the first years. As Stora shows in his book about Algerian history in which underlines the continuous strife in each period since French arrival, Napoleon III (in a trip to Algeria in 1852) declared that it "is not a colony... but an Arab kingdom...I am as much the emperor of the Arabs as of the French" (Stora, 2004: 5). For his part, Lefebvre, in a very interesting article regarding the attempt to erode the Muslim identity that French Colonization pursued in Algeria, maintains that during the Second Republic, France encouraged migration of French farmers to inhabit Algeria and "also to serve as a safety valve facing social tensions and strike in France" (Lefebvre, 1996: 83).

Once military rule finished, the coming of the Third Republic consolidated the formal and legal delineation of Algeria's status and at the same time founded colonial pillars on it. In 1881 the Northern part of Algeria was divided into three French departments (Algiers, Oran and Constantine). Southern territories in the Sahara remained under control by the Army. In such a way Algeria formally became a *province d'outre-mer*, was assumed as an integral part of France and, at least theoretically, submitted to the same Republican laws. Nevertheless, as Evans and Phillips (2007) affirm, it was always a case apart. The differences between Algeria and territories on the mainland were especially in two domains: firstly, the legal status guaranteed Algeria a wide financial autonomy which in turn provided increasing administrative self-sufficiency and political power to the governor and the local government as well. Secondly, the equality before the law alleged in the "European" part of France was not even formal in Algeria and, on the contrary, a social differentiation and exclusion was established. Such distinction was expressed in several ways. For instance, in political terms, although the Algerian departments had representatives in the National Assembly in Paris, they had to be full French citizens. At the local level, until 1919 only 5 percent of male Muslims were authorized to vote and their participation in municipal council could never be superior to 25 percent. In terms of prerogatives, "the colons enjoyed full rights; the colonized were 'subjects' not citizens, liable to special provisions: tallage, corvée, and detention without due process" (Stora, 2004: 6).

Therefore, the question of citizenship generated in practice a class-differentiated society in which local Muslims (including Berbers and in general Algerian tribes and clans) were a sort of monolithic second grade population who were not even considered citizens themselves. If they wanted to access citizenship their conversion to Christianity was necessary. As Milton-Edwards suggests in her book on the Middle East in which she analyzes the current challenges of the region originating in colonial times and introduces country-by-country case studies, in Algeria "such a conversion automatically divested them of their Muslim heritage and identity"

(Milton-Edwards, 2018: 48). From this perspective, the French rule in Algeria was also an attempt of cultural imposition detrimental to the local expressions. According to Maamri, who emphasizes the struggles for identity and citizenship in independent Algeria as well as the liability of the colonial period for them, “in their endeavors to civilize the natives, the French colonizers created for them a state of perpetual Otherness. They deconstructed then restructured the colonized people, and in the process depersonalized them” (Maamri, 2016: 31).

The social differences created a non-official segregation between the *pieds noirs* -as the settlers were called by the Muslims and by themselves- and the Islamic population on the opposite side, not only Arabs but also other minorities, including of course the Berbers. The exclusion created in linguistic and religious domains implied that despite the harshness of French rule in Algeria, the imposition of the metropolitan tongue or Christianity was not a successful process, which is why the local population conserved the Arab (and Berber languages) and Islam, elements which were determinative in the Independence War as constitutive of an alleged Algerian identity. At this point it is important to state that although the French project in Algeria was based on laicity during the Third Republic, just as Lefebvre (1996) argues, the settlers being mostly Christians was a fundamental difference between them and the locals. Even so, the social exclusion extended to other fields such as public transport, education, and even public spaces into the cities. Therefore, there were distinctive French and Muslim neighborhoods. The economic differences were also an important subject. Although the Muslim population was always a vast majority (by 1954 there were approximately 7 million and only 1 million French despite massive migration to Algeria), the property of the land was concentrated in French hands. The level of hoarding achieved 98 percent of the property by French in the most arable region (Stora, 2004: 7). Agriculture was the main economic activity until the First World War, and the term *colon*, usually related to colonizer or farmer, was used to denominate the French in general. Disparity in income was also a source of inconformity within Muslim workers. Regarding public service, it “made the most insignificant French government employee superior to any Arab” (Stora, 2004: 23).

Due to the deprivation that the conquest and the colonization process meant, and to the inequality that brought along with it, the Algerian nationalism was a constant phenomenon during the French rule. In 1871 the first considerable rebellion happened, but small turmoil persistently spread. In 1912 a group inspired by the Young Turks, and later known in its turn as the Young Algerians, was founded by a grandson of Abd Al-Khadar. Although it was actually a means for conscription of Muslims who fought for France in the war, the group had a political background demanding the extension of Muslim representation in the public sphere and was critical of French methods in Algeria. At the end of 1930s the movement became the *Fédération des Élus Indigènes*, whose main figure, Ferhat Abbas, transformed into a symbol of Algerian nationalism. At the same time, another well-known person, Messali Hadj, created more radical nationalist groups, movements and political parties fighting for emancipation.

The wave of nationalism was accompanied, on one hand, by a resurgence of Islamism, mainly personified in the figure of Abdelatif Soltani, who established links with the Muslim Brotherhood (founded in Egypt in 1928) and started the Algerian branch in 1953. Soltani defined as an objective the (re)Islamization of Algerian society. On the other hand, an Algerian Communist Party was created in 1936 as a branch of the French one. The effects of the 1929 recession, the Second World War and the internal economic crisis fed the Algerian claims for autonomy. In the midst of internal quarrels and disagreements, local elections, and reactions by the French ruler, several nationalist organizations were created between 1944 and 1954, one of them the Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action (CRUA) which was renamed *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) in October 1954 and on the following November 1st launched an insurrection.

Independent Algeria

The Independence War extended for more than 7 years and has been one of the bloodiest chapters in the Middle East and North Africa’s recent history, in terms of dead and displaced people and the destruction of the economy. In times when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, and Morocco and Tunisia had obtained their independence from France, for the French the conservation of Algeria became a priority. Therefore, the military deployment was excessive there, as was the repressive response to the FLN’s indiscriminate attacks. The film *The Battle of Algiers* (1964) illustrates the rawness of this confrontation. As an anecdote, it is worthwhile to say that the movie was banned in France until 1971 and has only had an open broadcasting since 2004. Finally, in March 1962 an agreement between the French government and Algerian rebels was achieved and after some political procedures, Algeria became independent in July. “Following the result, the colons began a process of mass exodus from their positions of power, as well as the lands that they had settled. The French dream that Algeria serve as the *province outre mer* had turned into a bloody nightmare and colonial disaster” (Milton-Edwards, 2018: 50).

The end of the war, besides the desired reach of autonomy, also marked the self-assumption by the FLN as the unique representative of Algerian nationalism and its prevalence within politics made it the only party for almost thirty years, during which it denied and even repressed political and cultural pluralism. But the independence was just the beginning of new problems for Algeria. After a Constitution was issued in 1963 and the first president (Ahmed Ben Bella) was designated, internal clashes -which would prove to be permanent- among nationalist factions within the FLN provoked a coup d'État in 1965. The man responsible for the coup, Houari Boumédiène, served as president until 1978.

During his period, he developed an Arab, Muslim and Socialist nationalism, which was expressed through a new constitution in 1976. He also had intense diplomatic activity in support of revolutionary causes at the same time that the third stage of the Algerian migration to France was initiated².

In 1978, Chadli Benjedid assumed his presidency. Two years later, an incident during an academic event led to a riot and then to massive protests by Berber communities alleging self-determination and the recognition of Kabyle language as official. The episode, known as the "Berber Spring" made re-emerge the Arab-Amazigh ethnic and linguistic rivalry which had laid beneath the pretension of a unified Algerian national identity. In 1988 a new wave of demonstrations took place. On this occasion protestors demanded the opening of a multiparty democracy, which indeed happened through a constitutional amendment. One of the new political parties, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won the first pluralist (local) elections in Algeria in 1990 and later, in January 1992 was expected to win a majority in the National Assembly. However, a few days prior to general voting, the military overthrew Benjedid, cancelled the elections, and dissolved the FIS. As a response, Islamist militias formed in the mountains of Algeria and guerrilla warfare started. The Algerian Civil War was equally or perhaps more ferocious than their war for independence. In that regard, Evans and Phillips indicate that "a cycle of terrorism and counter-terrorism ensued, creating a spiral of uncontrollable events that grew ever more savage" (Evans and Phillips, 2007: 14). Death victims are estimated in 200,000. In 1997, a ceasefire was negotiated by the Zeroual government (sworn in 1994) with one of the groups supporting the FIS which supposed the weakening of FIS itself that also suffered subsequent defeats on the fields of battle. "The military victory against violent Islamist insurgency and the election of the former foreign minister of Houari Boumediene, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, to the presidency in April 1999 reinvigorated Algerian foreign policy" (Boukhars, 2019: 244), argues Boukhars in a paper aimed at reviewing the role of Algeria in the provision of regional security against terrorism in recent years.

Bouteflika was re-elected president in 2004, 2009, and 2014. During the first decade of 2000, besides the task of recovering Algeria's image abroad, the government benefited from international solidarity with the post-conflict process and rises in income derived from fuel. The International Crisis Group, in a document on the current challenges of the Algerian economy that highlights the urgent necessity to cut the exaggerated dependence on high oil, asserts that "the economic dimension of the post-civil war years, including a period of high oil prices that enabled both social spending and the development of a new business elite, helped avoid a reprise of violence" (ICC, 2018: 1). Nevertheless, the fall of commodity prices since 2014 (oil and gas account for 97 percent of Algeria's total exports), Bouteflika's deteriorated health condition since 2013, the claims for political changes, and reports on corruption within the government in alliance with business groups, created altogether an unstable environment which exploded in February 2019, in what has been known as the *Hirak* Movement.

The initial motivation was opposition to the announced new run for presidency by Bouteflika in elections that were to be held in April 2019. Although the president finally desisted from his intention and resigned his position (he finally died in September, 2021), the protests continued. The head of the Council of the Nation (Senate), Abdelkader Bensala, was designated as interim president and announced elections for July. However, protesters rejected their legitimacy and they were cancelled. Later in September a new decree calling for elections in December 12 was issued, even so demonstrations did not cease. Demonstrators considered Bensala part of the same scheme of corruption and concentration of political power. Therefore, they demanded his dismissal. According to Grewal and others, who analyzed the Algerian uprising from the perspective of relations between civil society and the military, "the majority of Algerians (...) support the protest movement and want a complete change of the political system. Protesters and non-protesters alike are fed up with corruption and would prefer a transition to democracy. The military, having begrudgingly endorsed protesters' calls for Bouteflika's resignation, is now attempting to shepherd the transition to best preserve its interests" (Grewal et al, 2019: 1).

² According to Sayad, the Algerian migration to France had three stages: the first, before 1945 as male workforce in metal-related industries; the second, after 1945 when many Berbers were replaced by Arab-origin Algerians and entire families settled in France; the third, that supposed a 'family reunification' process in French territory. See: SAYAD, Abdelamlek (2004): *The suffering of the Immigrant*, Cambridge, Polity.

Indeed, the top head of the army and most powerful man in those days in Algeria, Gaïd Salah, pushed the judiciary to investigate the clan which former president Bouteflika belongs to for corruption. Some businessmen and politicians close to him were arrested although the detentions have also affected members of other economic groups. Nevertheless, in the end the military led by Salah turned its back on the people and repressed the demonstrations in order to assure the election's performance. As a result, only 40 percent of the electorate voted and Abdelmadjid Tebboune, former minister and member of the FLN, was elected as the new president and assumed his position on December 19, 2019. A few days later General Salah died of a heart attack and to the lack of legitimacy of the political system, another grade of uncertainty was added.

The Covid-19 pandemic in the first semester of 2020 worsened Algeria's situation and served to disperse, at least temporarily, the protests. In fact, the government issued a prohibition for public demonstrations on March. Finally, at the end of August 2020, the President Tebboune announced a referendum which was voted on November 1st, aiming at reforming the Constitution. Strongly criticized by the social movements that led the protests, which considered it barely introduced aesthetic changes that reinforce the status quo, the referendum had a scarce participation of 23 percent and within it the support for reforms reached 66 percent. Although the changes were approved, the low rate of support foresees a problem of legitimacy (that persisted in Parliamentary elections, in June 2021 and Local elections in November 2021 in which participation rates were 30% and 36% respectively). Based on previous experiences, it is possible for Algeria to be in the gates of a new revolution.

Problematic considerations

Algeria seems to face similar challenges than former colonies in the region. From a political point of view, democracy still lacks an adequate representation of ethnic groups and despite the formal existence of several political parties, the FLN (the only party legally authorized until 1988, as mentioned) has been largely hegemonic hence the main claims since 2019 have been related to democratic opening which even applies to some in the FLN disintegration. But the political defiance after Bouteflika's renunciation goes beyond the democratization issue. It puts into question the excessive role that the military has in the political system and the privileges that it ensures for itself. In the same sense, it is a reaction against the scheme of corruption which has spread in the whole government structure and the benefits obtained by reduced business groups, mostly linked to agriculture, oil revenues and the energy sector in general.

Another sphere that deserves attention in Algeria is the ethnic tensions between Arabs and the Amazigh, which despite timid reforms in recent years are far from being closed. Divergences that have been permanent can be exacerbated during the present period of crisis and Amazigh leaders can avail the opportunity to deepen their vindications. "They oppose rule from an alien center and agitate for a range of changes, from more ethnically sensitive policies on education, or the preservation of certain linguistic traditions, to outright secession and self-determination" (Milton-Edwards, 2018: 8). As stated, the background of this controversy is a matter of identity which - as in all around the Middle East and North Africa could not be solved by the establishment of new independent nation-states.

The economic crisis is another source of threat. Due to its almost complete dependence on hydrocarbons, the Algerian economy is tied to the behavior of international prices of primary resources that tend to be volatile. For instance, in the case of oil, it experienced high prices prior to 2014 but later fell with sudden and brief increases in 2018 and 2019, and suffered a historic fall in 2020. During 2022 (as an effect of conflict in Ukraine) prices rose again but stabilized after September (Trading Economics, 2022). Regarding this, Serrano considers that "Algeria's autocratic regime is replenishing its financial reserves after years of depleting them. This renewed budgetary space will make it easier for the government to deal with any hint of popular discontent". (Serrano, 2022). But then the unemployment rate is 12.7 percent and in the case of youth is almost 32 percent. (Macro Trends, 2022) This situation can stimulate migration (Algerians are the major immigrants to France) and supply fundamentalist groups. In Algeria, a branch of Al Qaeda, self-denominated 'of the Islamic Maghreb' (AQMI), appeared in 2007 with an attack on Algiers. Its presence extends to Tunisia, Mali, Mauritania and Libya, and in March 2019 expressed its sympathy for the protests against Bouteflika, so it seems to be active. For its part, in 2014 a group named 'Soldiers of the Caliphate' rose up alleging linkages to ISIS but was not successful. According to Boukhars, Algeria's experience on fight against terrorism helped its international and regional image. On this subject, he indicates that "the security partnership between the United States and Algeria was strengthened in 2010 with the signing of a customs mutual assistance agreement and a mutual legal assistance treaty" (Boukhars, 2019: 244). Similar agreements were reached with the UK, Germany and France and its influence on neighbor countries increased as well. However, many of these achievements were under Bouteflika's rule and recent chaos can deteriorate the security landscape.

Since Algeria's problems are very similar to other countries' in the region (and Global South) then its formal status as an integral part of the metropolis did not make any difference and Algeria, besides having materially been a colony, since its configuration as independent state has suffered all the pathologies derived from the decolonization process in general, and in the Middle East and North Africa experience in particular.

Attempts of envisaging

After the elections held in December 2019 the question remaining is what is coming for Algeria. Demonstrations began in February 2019 and were maintained for months. Fridays became for many the anti-government protest days and mobilizations extended to the Algerian diaspora in France. However, first because of the military intervention, later by the election itself and then due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the mood eased, and popular activism seems weakened. But it is also possible that in the following months social nonconformism will increase and generate greater pressure on political and military powers. It is difficult to determine whether an Arab Spring is looming in Algeria, but if some of the demands that arose on the occasion of Bouteflika's failed nomination are achieved, a new era may begin in the country's history involving a democratic opening. However, there are many differences to be resolved, indicating that even if there is a change, new government will have to deal with them.

As it has happened in the last 60 years, the role of the army is central. Surely, the military will not accept a reduction in its influence. Because of this, what Grewal and others highlight becomes relevant since "moving forward, protesters are likely to come into conflict with military personnel of all ranks over the military's political and economic privileges post-Bouteflika" (Grewal et al, 2019: 2). Therefore, they conclude that relations between civil society and the military could be the biggest obstacle to desired democratization. As has happened in Algeria's history, it may all end in a coup d'état and a new arms-backed government may end up being established. It is important to underline the growing influence that was deployed by the former commander of the army, Gaïd Salah -recognized as the real power behind the scene in 2019's developments- and the new army chief of staff, Saïd Chengriha, who belongs to the same group of the prior. Or it may also be that elections and referendum despite low attendance become a legitimizing element of the current regime and a blank check for continuity. Such a result can cause a revolt or resolve the current crisis, but only time will show which outcome it will have.

That being said, there are issues that seem cannot be postponed. The Arab-Amazigh dispute, the role of Islam within the state, and the pursuit of stable economic development are some of them. As Boukhars notes, "without recasting its political institutions and reshaping its economy, the country will continue to perform well below its potential" (Boukhars, 2019: 248). In a similar sense, the Algerian migration to France which concerns not only the Arab 'diaspora' but also the Kabyle population living in France is also a matter of interest.

Conclusion

If it was necessary to point out distinctive elements in the history of Algeria, based on the brief account attempted by this article, two constant subjects can be underlined: on one hand, the existence of multiple identities within the territory that involve ethnic, linguistic, and religious characteristics that not only represent a source of conflict but also become the main impediment for the construction of a common national identity. Such multiplicity that precedes the French ruling in Algeria faced attempts by the colonizer as well as by the independent Algerian state to be reduced, even if other identities were in fact recognized, under the purpose of a pretended unity. Its configuration as a nation-state has not achieved a consensual nationalism and on the contrary the pursuit of univocity has provoked a reinforcement of inhabitant distinguished communities. As Milton-Edwards states, regarding the whole Middle East and North Africa, "in addition, some forms of ethno-national identity are relatively recent constructs created in response to the threat of annihilation or assimilation" (Milton-Edwards, 2018: 8). So, the identity question remains a main discussion within Algerian society and the most noticeable controversy between Arab-Amazigh populations can in its turn overshadow the disputes amongst the complex network of tribes and clans settled in the country.

On the other hand, despite the differentiated status that France conferred to Algeria by virtue of which it was not officially a colony, the social reality in its territory between 1830-1962 and the experience during the independent period, proper to decolonization phenomena, are indicative of its colonial nature as a matter of fact. Therefore, Algeria is facing similar problems as other countries in the region, especially the consolidation of democracy as a difficult path, and the search for a national identity, as stated. Linked to these, there are the economic setbacks, the migration wave, and the role of Islam in politics. This could be understood in terms of the level of laicity that states should have or the participation of Muslim parties in elections. Fundamentalism is also a source of concern from which Algeria cannot detach itself. It is important to remember that Algeria is the biggest African country and most of its area is in the Sahara, which makes the territory difficult to control for Algerian authorities.

If guided only by the events narrated in this article, the French legacy in Algeria must be seen as negative. Maybe because of these results, France's contributions to Algerian society are ignored. Perhaps that was the source of controversy regarding tributes to Camus. But the fact is that there is a mark that has shaped the present in Algeria and that, considering recent migrations of Algerians to France and the Algerian population in France, in an inverse process than that of the second half of 19th century, Algeria has also printed its own legacy in French society which is facing its own transformation.

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