

Use of Track One and a Half Actors as Counter-Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in Kenya

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Abstract

This article argues that Al-Shabaab's cowardice decision to attack the Westgate Mall a soft target on Saturday 21st September, 2013 with the aim of dividing Kenyans along religious line failed miserably and instead was acatalyst in uniting the nation which was politically divided after March 2013 general election to speak with one voice. This was confirmed by the president speech at the end of counter-terrorism operation and in the presence of two presidential candidates' competitors' former prime minister Raila Odinga and former deputy prime minister Musalia Mudavadi at state house Nairobi. This barbaric act took place in Nairobi the capital city of Kenya, which is also East Africa leading economy. I argue that the viable option to fight terrorism in Kenya is use of Track One and a Half Diplomacy as Counter-Radicalisation and De-radicalisation.

Keywords: Terrorism, Ideology, Mass media, Counter-Radicalisation and De-radicalisation

Introduction

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in the globe, with the advent of new information technology, especially in the communication sector, terrorist groups have re-energized and accelerated their capacity to successfully plan and execute audacious local and transnational attacks in both Industrialized and developing countries. This is a worrisome trend that the international community must urgently and collectively respond to.

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For example in January 2013, there was a terrorist siege at the In Amenas gas plant in Algeria. For four days Al-Mulathameen Brigade terrorist group took hundreds of workers hostage at the gas plant on 16 January 2013, the siege ended when Algerian forces invaded the plant, resulting in heavy human casualties. In total, 685 Algerian workers and 107 of the 132 foreigners working at the plant were freed, while 37 hostages and 32 terrorists were killed. On 21 September 2013, there was Al-Shabaab, terrorist attack on the at the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, where more than sixty people lost their lives (Kenyatta, 2013). This confirms how terrorism is transnational and therefore an actor which cannot be ignored by other global actors like (track one) state (Borcan, 2010). Figure 1 shows how the global actors are interconnected.




Figure 1.1 Dimensions of Global Politics in the Book Global Politics (Andrew Heywood, 2011) Page Three

The term Al-Shabaab, mean “Mujahidin Youth Movement”, was formed about a decade ago when Somalia was lawless and ungovernable due to arms proliferation which accelerated clan-based militias. It announced its merger with Al-Qaeda in February 2012. Al-Shabaab terrorist is both, a locally focused Islamist insurgent group and inter and a transnational terrorist affiliate of Al-Qaeda. Even though Al Shabaab is an affiliate of Al-Qaeda, the cell seems to operate independently (Bryden, 2013).

Without the central government in Somalia, anarchy (realist theory) was the result and which led to the formation of Al-Shabaab as a militia loosely affiliated with a network of local Islamic courts that emerged in the 1990s (Rohan, 2005).

Methodology

The research employed quantitative and qualitative research methods. People in the security sector and opinion leaders were interviewed and provided primary data.

A total of two hundred and thirteen (213) people of which one hundred and fifty seven (157) were Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) security personnel, 20 from other government security agencies, 20 from private security firms' and sixteen (16) opinion leaders were interviewed.

This being a sensitive research topic, analysis of secondary data was done and in this respect, desk top, library research was done, where journals, internet, newspapers, books, and reports were consulted and studied. Secondary analysis allows for the examination of existing data yet can produce new and more detailed information, including the emergence of conclusions that differ to those in the original report (Orodho, 2005). The advantages of secondary analysis are that it is high quality data (Bryman, 2004) an additional strength of secondary analysis is quick and easy access to materials as documentary research is largely free of the restrictions and difficulties faced in primary data research, the researchers do not encounter rejection, non-response, bias, or any other respondentbased problems (Sarantakos, 2005).

The Origin of Al-Shabaab's Ideology

According to scholar Rudé, the word ideology was coined in 1796 by Destutt de Tracy who was influenced by John Locke which emphasized human senses for verification of knowledge and supported his program to create a democratic, rational, and scientific society (Rudé, 1980). Marx and Engels adopted the pejorative meaning when they called ideology the class-motivated deceptions of the bourgeoisie, which they contrasted with the correct scientific understandings of the conscious working class (Gerring, 1997).

Among those using the non-pejorative meaning, some political scientists use the term to distinguish people with coherent and well-structured rational belief systems from those with inconsistent or illogical belief systems while others use it to refer to any belief system, regardless of its internal consistency (Weberman, 1997). The leadership in Islamic courts held different ideologies, which reflected (multi) diverse views on religion and clannism. The courts and the militias were mostly clan-based, but the Al Shabaab's leadership had recruits from the different Somali clans, ascribing to a broader irredentist and religiously driven by "umma" vision of uniting ethnic Somali-inhabited areas of East Africa under an Islamist caliphate (Abdisaid, 2008).

Al-Shabaab's way of getting doing things has not emanated from the religious or the cultural identity of the Somali people. Religious rigidity and narrow interpretations of the Qur'an and Sunnah of the Prophet is alien component in traditional Somali Islam. The ultimate goals of al-Shabaab are the establishment of Islamic state, implementation of the Shari laws (Rohan, 2005). Al-Shabaab has ideological ties with Al-Qaeda and is linked to the international network of other similar organizations through leadership contacts, training and joint operations in the Horn of Africa (Oguna, 2012). Al-Shabab's ideology is believed to be espoused from Wahhabism which preaches a more literal interpretation of Islam and condemns innovations in Islam and rituals (Odhiambo et al, 2013).

The Westgate Malls Attack by Al-Shabaab

In mid October 2011, Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) moved into Southern Somalia to pursue Al-Shabaab terrorist after a series of attacks and kidnapping of tourist in Coast and Northern Kenya near the Somali border.

As result of the incursion by Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) into Somalia, it was expected that there would be reprisal attacks against Kenya because of a series of threats from the Al-Shabaab that it would attack Kenya if it dared send its forces to Somalia (Pflanz, 2011).

By its incursion into Somalia, Kenya provided ample justification for Al-Shabaab to finally make good on its threats to attack Kenya. The terror group subsequently announced that it would carry out reprisal attacks against Kenya (International Crisis Group, 2012).

It was clear that the Al-Shabaab terror group is against Kenya intervention in Somalia. There have been escalated terror attacks in North Eastern, Coastal and Nairobi Counties since the beginning of the incursion, providing evidence that threats of Al-Shabaab counter attacks are real. By Al-Shabaab losing Kismayu to Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), reprisal attacks on Kenya have become more pronounced (Eby, 2007).

The Al-Shabaab claimed the Westgate Malls attack on Saturday 21st September, 2013 was "retributive justice for crimes committed" by Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) in Somalia. The incursion and the subsequent capture of Kismayu by Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), a strategic port city, translated to the strangulation of Al-Shabaab's lifeline. When Al-Shabaab lost Kismayu, it lost its hold on the revenue from imports and exports through the Kismayu port.

The export of charcoal, dates, bananas, sheep, and goats provided hard currency in millions of dollars in annual tax revenue for Al-Shabab, as did imports of consumer goods (Rotberg, 2013). Therefore, the Westgate attack was fruition of the earlier warning by Al Shabaab for Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) stopping their lifeline source of income. The attack on Westgate mall again further proves Al-Shabaab's capability to launch deadly attacks outside its traditional Somali borders.

The Probable Causes of Westgate Mall Attack

The timing and the choice of Westgate mall a soft target and the way the attack was executed shows that Al-Shabaab had an elaborate plan and logistics to back up their cowardice and barbaric act of terrorism. Since hard targets are difficult to attack, terrorist groups always turn their wrath to soft targets which are vulnerable to depict the government as being unable to protect her citizens.

Therefore, choice of the Westgate mall a soft target could be informed by critical intertwined and interrelated considerations. First; Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) incursion into Somali was said by Al-Shabaab propagandist as being propelled by Western countries especially the United States of American (USA) and their allies and therefore, Al-Shabaab was to attack their interests.

Westgate mall being owned by an Israeli, a USA ally and frequented by westerners (foreigners) and affluent Kenyans because of its strategic location was appropriate a target, this attack was to achieve two fold viz: to intimidate Kenya to withdraw Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) from Somalia, because this mall was frequented by affluent Kenyans and their families and friends on weekends any success of the attack could definitely have inflicted the required reaction. By taking them hostage or killing them (prominent kenyan like business entrepreneurs, politicians, their families and friends), by their death Al-Shabaab strategists hoped these affluent Kenyans would pressure the Kenyan government to withdraw Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) from Somalia for example a nephew to president Uhuru Kenyatta was among those killed. The Westgate mall attack was to confirm the vulnerability of Kenyans to Al-Shabaab terrorist attack and force them to pull out of Somalia. This strategy floped and the Kenya government leadership re-affirmed their resolve to continue to be part of Africa Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) until the Somalia government has sustainable peace and is stable ecomically and militarily (Kenyatta, 2013).

Secondly, Al-Shabaab by being able to carry out the attack on the westerner's interest Westgate mall right in Nairobi the capital of East Africa largest economy, proved that though they have been greatly weakened by the Africa Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) forces they could still carry out attacks beyond the soil of Somalia. This shows how terrorism is a global phenomenon that needs concerted effort by the developed and the developing countries to be curbed. All countries are vulnerable to terrorism regardless of its development level (Martin, 2010).

Lastly, the high stature of the westgate mall, its central locality in Nairobi and the cadre of visitors that frequented it, made it as one of the most valuable target to the Al-Shabaab because Nairobi being business hub and host to different international news media outlets, the attack received both local and international media attention that helped bolsters Al-Shabaab's image in the ranks of global terrorist groups. The Al-Shabaab's war strategists planned the execution of the attack to be in the form of predetermined killing and hostage-taking for deliberate prolonged duration for maximum media coverage.

As was shown in Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) clips the terrorist had sufficient time to pray in the mall as even Kenyans and the rest of the world were anxiously waiting for the news of the hostages.

This propaganda was to paint a picture and create a scene to Kenyans and the globe that the capacity of Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda and other terrorist cells has not been defeated by Africa Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) and the international community fighting them (Associated Press, 2013).

Mass Media and Terrorism

The evolving nature of terrorism is mass media oriented. It is worth to note that most of terrorist barbaric and inhuman activities are carried out in public glare to draw the attention of local and the international media as was witnessed during Westgate mall attack. It is prudent to assert that terrorist acts aim at killing, maiming by causing a large number of casualties, these acts and their propaganda raises panic and fear within the public with the courtesy to the media, which participates collaterally in every terrorist attack (Nacos, 2006).

The revolution in modern high technologies have made it possible for terrorist cells to use the mass media as a powerful tool, in such a way that mass media serves to further the interests of terrorists, against its own will and the wider audience.

Terrorists' attacks are always executed to coincide with prime programmes like news time in order to gain publicity, but also legitimacy that media attention creates in the eyes of their followers and fans (Spencer, 2010).

In 1969, a Brazilian terrorist Marighella Carlos and a theorist of modern terror wrote a manual of the Urban Guerrilla which has widely been used as a reference manual by terrorist's groups. The manual elaborates on media centrality in furthering terrorist's actions. Marighella states that; "to inform about the revolutionists' actions is enough for the modern mass media to become an important tool of propaganda and that the psychological war is a technique of fight, based on direct or indirect usage of the mass media" (Cepulskaitė, 2000).

As was witnessed in Westgate mall attack, terrorism is a violent act that is conceived specifically to attract attention and then, through the publicity it generates, to communicate a message.

This is confirmed by one of the leaders of the United Red Army who said: "violent actions... are shocking. We want to shock people, everywhere... It is our way of communicating with the people (Hoffman, 2003). Since mass media, is a critical conduit of information on terrorist acts, it plays a core part in the terrorists' calculus. By spreading the terror and outrage to a much larger audience both locally and internationally, Al-Shabaab terrorists gained the maximum of their actions and intentions they needed to pass information that Kenyans and their partners in the fight against terrorism will not be safe until they withdraw Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) and other African Union (AU) forces from Somalia (Odhiambo et al, 2013). It was evidently clear that the information about Westgate mall attack, especially killings and hostage taking, was for mass media a source of news, because of its brutality this news was horrific and therefore, raised public and global attention, which automatically raised the number of readers and viewers ratings, and thus translating to media companies' profit (Anzalone, 2013). Mass media outlets will always do so in case of terrorist attacks with the intention of both informing the public of the occurrence but at the same time to gain profit from it, because of a large public audience and attention for such an event (Rotberg, 2013). According to scholar Wilkinson, every percentage of rating increases and raises the annual profit by tens of millions of pounds. This means that most of editors of mass media houses may not be aware of the implications of terror publicity caused by their relentless struggle to increase their sale and viewers ratings (Wilkinson, 2002).

Respond to Westgate Attack

Actors in International Relations are grouped into two broad categories: state and non-state actors. The former denotes the sovereign states characterized by definite territory; population and government as a result of the Treaty of Westphalia 1648. The latter are the wide array of actors defined by the fact that they are not states. Such include the international organizations, multinational organizations, and transnational organizations, individuals (Spanier and Wendzel, 1995). Track-one Diplomacy is state led, Track-two Diplomacy non-state led; Track One and a Half Diplomacy is the combination of track one and two.

Adherents to the concept of a Westphalian system refer to the Peace of Westphalia signed in 1648 which ended the Thirty Years' War, in which the major European countries at the time (the Holy Roman Empire, Spain, France, Sweden and the Dutch Republic) agreed to respect the principle of territorial integrity.

In the Westphalian system, the national interests and goals of states (and later nation-states) were widely assumed to go beyond those of any citizen or any ruler. States became the primary institutional agents in an interstate system of relations. The Peace of Westphalia is said to have ended attempts to impose supranational authority on European states. The "Westphalian" doctrine of states as independent agents was bolstered by the rise in 19th century thought of nationalism, under which legitimate states were assumed to correspond to nations groups of people united by language and culture (Osiander, 2001).

Diplomacy Tracks

Track-one Diplomacy (Traditional/Official: Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy) The term "track-one diplomacy" refers to official governmental diplomacy, or "a technique of state action, which is essentially a process whereby communications from one government go directly to the decisionmaking apparatus of another". Thus, track-one diplomacy is conducted by official representatives of a state or state-like authority and involves interaction with other state or state-like authorities: heads of state, state department or ministry of foreign affairs officials, and other governmental departments and ministries. Track-one diplomacy may also be referred to as "first track" or "first tier" diplomacy. These official diplomatic efforts can be distinguished from unofficial interactions, which may involve conflict resolution specialists, private citizens, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or businesses.

Such unofficial interactions are referred to as "track-two diplomacy." In the metaphor of track one and track-two diplomacy, each type of diplomatic effort proceeds along a different track, just as separate trains might follow different tracks (Jonsson and Hall, 2005).

Along the official track, track-one diplomacy may take place bilaterally between two states, or multilaterally when several states interact together, and even regionally or globally through intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). For example, when Estonia and Russia negotiated over issues related to the Russian-speaking people living in Estonia, these negotiations were examples of bilateral track-one diplomacy. When the OSCE and its High Commissioner on National Minorities held consultations with Estonia, Russia, and other Baltic states, that was an example of regional track-one diplomacy.

Much of the work of the United Nations could be classified as global track-one diplomacy (Ziegler, 1984). The purpose and intentions of track-one diplomatic efforts may vary greatly: track-one diplomacy may be used coercively and may involve sanctions, ultimatums, and psychological intimidation; it may be used persuasively and involve argumentation and/or compromise; it may be used as a means of adjusting states' relationship to and views of one another; and it may be a tool for reaching mutual agreements which may themselves reflect elements of persuasion or coercion. Track-one diplomacy may be used by a thirdparty state to help bring about an agreement between other states (Latifi, 2011).

Track Two Diplomacy (New/ Citizen Diplomacy)-Citizen diplomacy, or Track Two diplomacy, is about how citizens as private individuals can make a difference in world affairs. Some specific examples show how individuals and very small groups, through their own dynamism and through their own leadership, can take on a government and actually bring about a change in national policy, something that is very difficult to do.

Track Two diplomacy has two broad objectives; First of all, it aims to reduce conflict between groups and nations by improving communication and understanding. It tries to lower anger, tension, fear, and misunderstanding. It tries to humanize the face of the enemy and get one group to understand the other group's point of view. Its second objective is to change the thinking of Track One, hopeful that diplomats will become more open on a particular issue, and eventually come to accept Track Two thinking on that particular issue.

It is not a substitute, but should be seen as an additional tool, as a supplement. It should not be seen as a threat by Track One, but unfortunately at times it has been viewed that way. Actually, you have to refer to Track One in the final analysis if you are successful, because official interaction, signing of treaties and documents, and so on, can only take place between governments (Traub, 2000).

Track Two diplomacy referred to conflict resolution efforts by professional non-governmental conflict resolution practitioners and theorists. "Track Two has as its object the reduction or resolution of conflict, within a country or between countries, by lowering the anger or tension or fear that exists, through improved communication and a better understanding of each other's point of view" (McDonald & Bendahmane, 1987, p. 1).

The efforts of these conflict resolution professionals, generally operating through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and universities, arose from the realization by diplomats and others that formal official government-to-government interactions were not necessarily the most effective methods for securing international cooperation or resolving differences. Track two diplomacy is unofficial, non-structured interaction. It is always open minded, often altruistic, and strategically optimistic, based on best case analysis. Its underlying assumption is that actual or potential conflict can be resolved or eased by appealing to common human capabilities to respond to good will and reasonableness (Fisher, 2005). Mapendere (2000) defined Track One and a Half Diplomacy, as a public or private interaction between official representatives of conflicting governments or political entities such as popular armed movements, which is facilitated or mediated by a third party not representing a political organization or institution. The aim of such interaction is to influence attitudinal changes between the parties with the objective of changing the political power structures that caused the conflict (p. 16). Nan (2003) defined Track One and a Half Diplomacy as “unofficial interactions between official representatives of states” (p. 9). In 2005, Nan redefined Track One and a Half as “diplomatic initiatives that are facilitated by unofficial bodies, but directly involve officials from the conflict in question” (p. 165). Nan’s definitions are not dissimilar from Mapendere’s (2000) definition in that the parties are official representatives, but facilitators are ordinary citizens.

Therefore, the main feature that distinguishes Track One and a Half from Track One is that the third party is not a representative of a political institution.

Pure Track One conflict resolution efforts are facilitated or mediated by government representatives or representatives of political institutions such as the UN and regional groups. President Clinton’s Camp David mediation between Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak is purely Track One, while Former Finnish Prime Minister Martti Ahtisaari’s mediation in Aceh is Track One and a Half (Jones, 2008).

On the other hand the main feature that distinguishes Track One and a Half from Track Two is the parties to the process. In Track Two Diplomacy, the parties involved in the conflict resolution process are not official representatives of the conflicting sides, but influential citizens.

This is not the case for Track One and a Half where the parties involved in the conflict resolution process are official representatives of the conflicting groups. Therefore, Track One and a Half Diplomacy can also be called “hybrid diplomacy” because it is a cross-fertilization of Track One and Track Two that gives the third party diplomatic agility to flip from Track One to Track Two conflict resolution techniques in accordance with the situation (Kelman, 2002).

Track One and a Half as a hybrid form of diplomacy can be conducted in various ways. It can be carried out privately in the same manner Track Two activities are conducted, or publicly like Track One Diplomacy. President Carter’s intervention in Haiti in 1996 was carried out in the full awareness of the public and the media, whilst his go-between role in the North Korean- U.S. conflict in 1994 was private. The Sudan-Uganda mediations that were undertaken by the Carter Center from 1999 to 2003 were mostly private and confidential, except for the agreement signing ceremony in Nairobi. The decision to have a private or public Track One and a Half process cannot be prescribed, but is determined by the situation and the people involved (Davies and Kaufman, 2002).



KDF Special forces entering Westgate mall Retrieved on 5-5-2014 from <https://www.google.com/search?q=westgate+mall+attack&tbm=isch&tbo=u&source=univ&sa=X&ei=cpBnU4TxEMOp7Abm4YD4BQ&ved=0CEcQ7Ak&biw=1366&bih=564>

Security experts and Kenyans expressed a variety range of emotions following the terrorist attack on the Westgate Mall and proposed different ideas for how the country can be proactive against Al- Shabaab. Their Ideology was mainly informed by the realist theory where the state is the main actor. They had four schools of thought on how the Kenyan government should respond to Al-Shabaab numerous attacks and threat namely: Counter-Radicalization and De-radicalization, Withdraw Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) from Somalia, increase the ratio of police officers to the recommended number by the United Nations (UN) and Seal and secure our porous boarder with Somalia.

1. Counter-Radicalisation and De-radicalisation

The Kenyan government should encourage and partner with non-statist actors to help in Counterradicalisation and Deradicalisation (International Crisis Group, 2012). Counter-radicalisation as adopted by the United Nations Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that lead to Terrorism is “a package of social, political, legal, educational and economic programmes specifically designed to deter disaffected (and possibly already radicalised) individuals from crossing the line and becoming terrorists.” In other words, counter-radicalisation works upstream to prevent radicalisation by reducing vulnerability and increasing resilience (Ryan and Neumann, 2009). According to United Nations Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that lead to Terrorism are “programmes that are generally directed against individuals who have become radical with the aim of re-integrating them into society or at least dissuading them from violence.” Deradicalisation seeks to reverse the radicalisation process for those already or partly radicalised or help them to disengage with radical or extreme groups, whether or not they change their ideas. As a result, it tends to work with individuals more than groups and in contrast to counterradicalisation is much further downstream at the point of vulnerability and danger (UN. First Report of the Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism: Inventory of State Programmes, 2008).

Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) can help to prevent radicalization by tackling the underlying economic, social and political drivers of radicalization. Governments play an important role in this regard in setting the policy framework, providing funding, and addressing structural issues, but communities also need to play their part for the overall approach to be successful. Government can sometimes struggle to conduct community-level intervention work at the local level, so there needs to be a partnership approach (Sutphin, 2004).

Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) has a role to play in terms of narratives and messages. It can challenge the narratives of radicalizers and extremists and put forward positive alternatives. These counter-messages are often more effective when they come from communities themselves, rather than governments. This often goes hand in hand with work to strengthen citizenship, integration and a sense of belonging, and also that which seeks to create safe spaces for dialogue and discussion of contentious issues, especially among young people, to provide opportunities to explore the concerns that radicalizers seek to exploit. Part of the process of taking on divisive narratives is modelling an inclusive society that listens and responds to the needs and concerns of all citizens (Ury, 1999).

Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) can spot the signs of vulnerability and work up stream to protect individuals from radicalization, through improved parenting, neighbourhood support, and community resilience. Civil society response in this regard will often occur in the normal pattern of everyday life and interactions, rather than specific projects or interventions, but it requires communities to be equipped to play this role and have established intergenerational relationships. There is also a role for frontline workers such as teachers, doctors, social workers, health/mental health professionals, prison officers and probation staff who come into contact with potentially vulnerable individuals and will be in a position to offer support or refer individuals to specialised professionals for further help (Gelder, 2009). Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) can play a role in the de-radicalization process. Some community organisations will play a leading role in the process themselves, because of their specialist expertise, sometimes provided by staff and volunteers who have been radicalized themselves. Other community organisations and members will play a facilitative role, in providing practical help and emotional support to the individuals concerned and their families in the difficult days and months around the de-radicalization or disengagement process (Nan, 2005).

Frontline workers are also likely to be involved, with a heightened emphasis in recent years on the role of prisons, probation services and mental health professionals. Civil society can spot the signs of vulnerability and work up stream to protect individuals from radicalization, through improved parenting, neighbourhood support, and community resilience. Civil society response in this regard will often occur in the normal pattern of everyday life and interactions, rather than specific projects or interventions, but it requires communities to be equipped to play this role and have established intergenerational relationships. There is also a role for frontline workers such as teachers, doctors, social workers, health/mental health professionals, prison officers and probation staff who come into contact with potentially vulnerable individuals and will be in a position to offer support or refer individuals to specialised professionals for further help (Bartoli, 2013).

2. Withdraw Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) from Somalia

Kenya became a soft target of retaliation because of Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) pre-emptive and preventive incursion against Al-Shabaab in mid October 2011. For the African Union (AU), the entry of KDF and subsequent quick gains against Al-Shabaab was a set back to the terrorist and marked its down fall and semblance for stability in Somalia. The African Union (AU) subsequently requested of the Kenyan government that the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) be integrated into African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), including incorporating its objectives within the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) mandate (Oguna, 2012). The legal requirements for rehatting were followed, and the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) in Somalia were later formally integrated into AMISOM on 22 February 2012 after the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2036 but the symbolic rehatting was on July 6, 2012 in Nairobi where they became part of Africa Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) an African peaceenforcement and peace-keeping force sent there to restore law and order. Al-Shabaab claimed that Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) had “massacred” innocent civilians in southern Somalia during its operations, and it threatened to increase attacks if Kenya did not withdraw its troops, Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSC) (OSC Report, 2013). Kenya’s military plays a key role in the regional operations against Al Shabaab in Somalia (Raghavan and Lynch, 2013). Therefore, Westgate mall attack was to force the Kenyan government to withdraw Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) from Somalia.

3. Increase the Ratio of Police Officers

The Kenyan police service is understaffed and therefore the country is under policed. The United Nations (UN) recommends that police-public ratio of 1:450 which Kenya has not met yet (Kimani, 2012). It is critical to note that even with the few police officers Kenya has, a good number are engaged in guarding the political elites or serving as drivers to top government officials. This reduces the number of police officers engaged in crime prevention (Gimode, 2007).

Following the Westgate attack, government critics has been questioning why the Mall was not better protected. Being owned by Israeli and frequented by wealthy Kenyans and western tourists made it a more attractive target for Al-Shabaab terrorist attack. Since the number of police officers is inadequate to provide security to all critical Infrastructure and citizens as recommended by the United Nations (UN) most of Kenya's popular Malls have inadequate security. This has forced shopping malls, Hotels and other critical Infrastructure to hire private security firms to guard there premises but who are ill trained and equipped to repel terrorist attack (Mwenda, 2005).

It is prudent to assert that by posting more guards from private firms who are ill trained and equipped at the entrance of shoppings malls and critical infrastructure is not the answer because there are too many potential targets in Kenya to effectively secure them all. Posting guards to is not enough if they are not well trained and well armed, they are unlikely to counter terrorists who are well trained and armed and there attacks are well coordinated. Ill trained and equipped private security guards are only effective against attackers who do not want to be caught or harmed, such as armed robbers. They are far less effective against contemporary terrorists, who are often willing to give up their lives as part of their operations, and as a result are willing to take far higher risks.

4. Seal and Secure our Porous Boarder with Somalia

Any government in the world in the wake of a terrorist attack usually calls to security organs and the citizens to be more vigilant and increase border security in order to prevent the movement of terrorists into and out of the country. This reactionary strategy is to make it difficult to illegally move people and weapons across borders is a positive endeavour so far as security is concerned.

But in the current context, it is not clear how much safer efforts to increase border security would actually make Kenyans and their property secure (Otiso, 2009). The Kenya-Somalia long and porous boarder is difficult seal and secure, therefore, it is also right to acknowledge that the fallacy of thinking that Al-Shabbab are Somali by origin is no longer tenable where Kenya has been attacked by Kenyans who are not of Somalia origin. Sealing and securing the boarder might only be effective to prevent Al-Shabbab movement from Somalia to Kenya but it is probable that Al-Shabaab has already deployed radicalized militants inside Kenya. It is also probable that the militants have been successful in recruiting supporters within Kenya's borders. Therefore, sealing and securing the border is unlikely to prevent another attack (Odula, 2011).

Sealing and securing might not mitigate against those Kenyans within the country who have been radicalized and hence will continue to carry out the attacks. This is Cristal clear because of the terrorist attacks that have taken place after the Westgate mall attack for example on 1 April 2014, in Eastleigh, Nairobi, six people were died and several injured when terrorists detonated bombs at two separate locations about three hundred meters apart (Angira and Njagi, 2014). On 23 April 2014, a terrorist car bomb that exploded in Nairobi's Pangani quarter killed four people (Majuni, 2014). On 3 May 2014, there were twin terrorist attacks in Mombasa which killed three people (Ombati, 2014). And on 4 May 2014, on the Thika Supper Highway in Nairobi, terrorists exploded homemade bombs on two commuter buses, nearly simultaneously and about a kilometer apart, where three people were killed and more than sixty people were injured (Kithuure, 2014).

Challenges in Diplomacy and Foreign Relations

In international relations, diplomacy is inevitably driven by changing events, if not exclusively so. The points of contact between states have increased dramatically. International trade, tourism, migration, development assistance, and cultural exchanges have linked countries together. The communications revolution, the impacts of modern technology, the emergence of new non-government influences (business, the professionals, civil society), the new risks (environmental dilapidation, resource scarcity), as well as those intractable afflictions (poverty) magnified by globalization are all set to undermine diplomatic services over the pursuit of relations and issues between countries.

Diplomatic communication, traditionally based on “government-to-government” and “diplomat-to-diplomat” interactions, has expanded to include “government-to-people” contacts (Yusoff and Soltani, 2013).

In contrast, the objective of Al Shabaab's for Somalia are contrary to the international community democracies efforts to create a stable and inclusive Somali government. The Somali fragile government is not militarily and economically empowered to secure their territory and have relied on Africa Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) forces to retake and secure the capital, Mogadishu, from Al Shabaab, which has controlled much of southern and central Somalia since 2006. Since February 2011, military offensives by Africa Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), allied regional forces from Ethiopia and Kenya, Somali government troops, and allied militia have pushed Al Shabaab out of the major cities and ports, but it continues to enjoy some freedom of movement and to control territory in rural areas (United Nations, 2013).

The capture by Africa Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) of strategic towns from Al Shabaab has deprived them of critical economic resources needed to finance their operations which have resulted in a shift in its operations. As the Africa Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) forces through Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) approached Mogadishu in August 2011, the Al Shabaab made ‘strategic withdrawal’ from the town, but even with the ‘strategic withdrawal’ the group has accelerated its cowardice and barbaric attacks on foreign targets especially Kenya, Somali government, Africa Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) and civilians (Odhiambo, 2013).

The pronounced attacks against foreign targets in 2013 include a June attack against the United Nations (U.N) compound in Mogadishu, in which 22 people were killed, and a July attack on the Turkish diplomatic residence there and the 21 September 2013 attack at the Westgate Premier Shopping Mall in Nairobi in which more than sixty people died (Cruickshank and Lister, 2013). The Al-Shabaab mostly use improvised explosive devices (IEDs) of various types, mortars, grenades, and automatic weapons, causing hundreds of civilian casualties (Navanti Group, 2013). Some observers argue that Al-Shabaab has been greatly weakened by Africa Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) gains.

However, United Nations (UN) experts suggest that avoiding direct military confrontation has allowed Al-Shabaab to “preserve the core of its fighting force and resources,” with some 5,000 fighters who remain “arguably intact in terms of operational readiness, chain of command, discipline and communication capabilities” (United Nations Security Council, 2013).

According United Nations Information Service, many join Al-Shabaab for economic reasons and not only on Religious Fundamentalism (United Nations Information Service, 2013). Because of the ideological ties and links between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda, they have support from other international terrorist foreign fighters not of Somali descent but from Kenya, Sudan, Yemen, Bangladesh, Chechnya, Pakistan, Europe, Australia, Canada, and the United States (Rodriguez, 2013).

Though most terrorist cells are affiliated to Al-Qaeda, they act independently as can be confirmed by the numerous attacks in Kenya by Al Shabaab (Kulish et al, 2012). The attack at Westgate Premier Shopping Mall, in Nairobi reflects the new guidelines reportedly released by Al Qaeda leadership, instructing affiliated groups to use hostages to attract maximum publicity, and may signal a more global focus by Al Shabaab leadership (Cruickshank and Lister, 2013).

Westgate Mall Attack as Catalyst that United resilient Kenya



President Uhuru Kenyatta Addressing kenyans through press alongside Former PM Raila Odinga, Former DPM Musalia Mudavadi and other leaders at State House Nairobi retrieved at Daily Nation 24/09/2013 15:11:00
<https://www.facebook.com/DailyNation/posts/10151936097809497>

Edited Speech by President Uhuru Kenyatta, at the Conclusion of the Counter-Terrorism Operation at Westgate Mall, 24 Th September 2013

The agents of Terror themselves craven wretches and lowly cowards had the agenda of perpetrating grievous mayhem in our country, senselessly killing, maiming and traumatizing harmless, innocent people. We confronted this evil without flinching, contained our deep grief and pain, and conquered it. As a nation, our head is bloodied, but unbowed. The criminals found us unafraid, as we ever shall be. We cannot be conquered. We have ashamed and defeated our attackers. That part of our task has been completed by our multi-agency security team.

Fellow Kenyans, Friends of Kenya, Our solidarity, patience and resolve has seen us through the worst of this crisis. It is to you that I turned, for strength, love and aid to those afflicted by this encounter with the forces of evil. You came out in ways that exceeded the wildest expectations. You have been generous, compassionate and patriotic. I am deeply moved and very proud to be your President.

The response of the people throughout the country has been nothing short of wonderful. I have always known that our country is a splendid nation of fine, patriotic citizens. The unity, selflessness and empathy shown to the affected over the last three days has been touching and exemplary. We could not, in all fairness, ask more of you, and yet the revelation of your nobility continues to amaze. Without a task force, organizing committee or chain of command, you have risen up as one and stood firmly with your country, your brothers and sisters.

The following edited speech by the president surrounded by other leaders of political divide he competed with and won in the disputed presidential general election of March, 2013, affirms how the terrorist act at West gate mall attack united all Kenyans regardless of their political affiliation.

You have raised more than 60 million shillings through mobile money to help the affected. You have also donated food, clothing and other supplies, not only for the afflicted, but also to keep the volunteers going. You have gifted fellow Kenyans, and our visitors blood, without pausing to consider whether they were Giriama, Dasanach, Turkana, Kuria or Embu, West African, Pakistani, British or German. Your response to appeals for blood donations has been literally overwhelming. There is, evidently, no limit to your patriotic sacrifice. I thank the doctors, nurses, counselors and other volunteers who thought nothing of their comforts and personal engagements when called upon to be their brother's keepers. I salute national leaders of every stripe who stood together to reassure the nation that deep inside, where it counts most, we are one, indivisible national family. For sharing the nation's pain and anxiety, and for reaffirming the core principles of leadership, you have encouraged the nation. Let no one amongst us ever be blamed for dividing the people of Kenya.

But we have been brave, united and strong. Kenya has stared down Evil and triumphed. We have prevailed just by being who we typically are, and have been from the time of our forefathers. In caring and giving; in loving and uniting; in never tiring, and not hesitating, in resolutely looking forward and never turning back, we have defeated our enemies and shown the whole world what our values can accomplish. As we put this tragic period behind us, let us stay true to who we are. Our attackers wished to destroy the essential character of our society. They failed. Kenya endured. Kenya endures. With our openness and inclusivity, we shall confront and overcome all the challenges facing us as a nation. We shall rise as one, defend and build this nation together. In one accord we have triumphed. In one accord, we shall prosper. The incident which we now put behind was certainly not welcome. Yet it has strengthened us and renewed our resolve to live as one strong, open, stable, democratic and prosperous Republic, where people of all races, cultures and faiths pursue happiness together. We must live as a diverse, tolerant society with neither bias nor barriers to all people of goodwill. Our openness, enterprise and generosity have brought us through adversity to where we are, and will impel us achieve our collective and individual dreams.

Amid the horror and confusion of the past few days, you have found it in yourselves to be incredibly strong and generous. You have held each other's hand, and extended this love to our visitors. Your resilience and compassion have saved many lives and brought hope and comfort to countless families.

I have drawn strength and inspiration from your wonderful example. My resolve to ensure that my Government delivers to you is strengthened even more by the certainty that I lead a nation of fine folk who deserve our best work. Let us work in unity, in the spirit with which we defeated the monster of terrorism, to heal the wounds inflicted on us, and to confront the obstacles in our way to prosperity. We must put development and happiness within our reach. We will ensure that Kenya always retains its honour among nations. The Glory of Kenya, is the Fruit of our collective Labour. That is what our founding fathers inscribed in our National Anthem. Because of what we have done, we have not been shaken. As long as Kenya remains our home, we are indomitable.

Conclusions

The Westgate attack elucidates the transnational nature of terrorism. The staging of numerous attacks by Al-Shabaab in Kenya has united Kenyans and therefore, the government resolves to keep Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) as part of Africa Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) to pacify and liberate the portions still under the control of Al-Shabaab. Kenya and her Allies are more determined to crackdown on the Al-Shabaab and other terrorist groups. But the Kenya government needs to counter-terrorism in a proactive, robust and measured way, it should avoid reactionary policies and reactions that could lead to further radicalisation of Kenya's Somali and Muslim communities, thereby creating more home grown terrorist. The Kenyan government should adopt an integrated approach which recognizes that no one strategy will make Kenya secure if deployed in isolation. Human, tools, infrastructure and material for the security sector should be modernised.

Recommendations

- A. Critical infrastructure need to have trained security deployments with the necessary skill to deal with different scenarios. Training in suspicious behavior detection is important for the early identification of potential threats and pre-attack reconnaissance. Security deployment must be proactive and create deterrence as unprotected assets create vulnerability which attracts the adversary.
- B. Collaboration and partnerships between law enforcement and the private sector are important force multipliers for dealing with the issue of soft targets.

- C. The wide use of social media by terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab demonstrates the growing importance of social media as a terrorist tool. It is important to ensure that terrorist sites, mediums, message boards and posts are closely monitored by relevant security agencies as a valuable tool for early detection of potential threats, measuring social temperament and obtaining a situational picture during an attack.
- D. Hardening of structures and blast mitigation measures should be considered in the planning stages for new construction of critical infrastructure.

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